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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON



S/S 5553

April 16, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

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Subject: Possible Statement of U.S. Cuban Policy

In accordance with your oral request there is enclosed a slightly modified version of Mr. Schlesinger's draft Cuba policy statement, cleared in the Department.

The Department recommends that the statement not be issued at this time for these reasons: 1) it would tend to magnify the Miro affair out of proportion; 2) it would make us appear defensive; and it would probably stimulate further public discussion of exile affairs, when the reverse would be desirable.

William H. Brubeck  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Draft Cuba Policy Statement

DETERIORATING COPY REPLACED BY  
ELECTROSTATIC COPY

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DECLASSIFIED

Dept. of State NLK-75-203

E.O. 11652, 3(C) and 5(D), or (E)

By MCO NARS, Date 4/29/76

STATEMENT OF CUBAN POLICY

The goal of American policy in Cuba has always been to safeguard the security of the free states of the hemisphere and to bring freedom as speedily as possible to the people of Cuba.

This goal can be pursued in two ways. It can be pursued by the road of invasion and war. Or it can be pursued by the road of unrelenting pressure and isolation.

War is obviously a method of last resort. This government has repeatedly stated that it will not conduct an invasion of Cuba unless the Castro regime undertakes to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force. No responsible voice in our country advocates invasion on any other terms. For us to behave otherwise would be to be false to our traditions as a nation. Should, however, the Castro regime threaten other states, we will use whatever means are necessary to prevent that regime from taking action against any part of the western hemisphere.

In the meantime, the road of pressure and isolation has already produced significant results. In the political field, the nations of the hemisphere have

excluded

excluded the Castro regime from participation in the Organization of American States and have pronounced the principles of that regime incompatible with those of the Inter-American System. Last October, the Latin American countries voted unanimously in support of the quarantine. Only five Latin American states today maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba. Throughout the hemisphere, there has been a steady decline in the Fidelista and Communist influence.

In the economic field, trade between Cuba and the Atlantic Community and Latin America in 1962 was about 15% what it was in 1960, and will probably be still smaller in 1963.\* The number of free world ships calling at Cuban ports during the first three months of this year is also about 15% of what it was during the same period a year ago. Free world commercial airlines have now virtually ceased servicing Cuba.

In the security field, the states of Central America recently took action in meetings with the United States at

San Jose

\*NOTE: If comparative total Free World trade with Cuba 1962 vs. 1960 is desired, the percentage would be about 25%.

San Jose and Managua to control the movement of people to and from Cuba and to protect the hemisphere against Cuban subversive activities. At the same time, we continue to assist a number of Latin American countries in developing programs to counter internal subversion and insurrection. Our aerial surveillance of Cuba, based on OAS action, assures us full advance warning in the event of any new military effort within Cuba.

These measures to seal off Cuba from the inter-American community must be seen against the background of the continent-wide undertaking, through the Alliance for Progress, to combat poverty, ignorance and disease throughout the Americas, to advance economic progress, social justice and personal freedom and to bring a better life to all the people of the hemisphere. As this great affirmative effort gathers force, the contrast between the possibilities of democratic development and the actualities of Communist mismanagement and oppression, as exhibited in Cuba, will further hasten the inevitable downfall of the Castro regime.

There is no cheap or painless way of freeing Cuba overnight. But the passion for freedom in Latin America

is in the grain of history, just as dictatorship anywhere on this continent represents a frustration of the deep hopes and needs of the people of the hemisphere. The inexorable processes of economic, political and moral isolation will in the end render the position of the Castro regime untenable and make the Cuban people free -- as these same processes have ended the careers of innumerable other American dictators and brought freedom to their peoples.

April 16, 1963

**DRAFT FOLLOWS**

Cuba

April 16, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

I gather that the white paper idea is dead; and that Palm Beach now wants a brief statement, to be put out by the State Department, explaining our Cuban policy insofar as it can be explained. I hope the attached may be of some use.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

as:gs

## STATEMENT ON CUBAN POLICY

The goal of American policy in Cuba has always been to safeguard the security of the free states of the hemisphere and to bring freedom as speedily as possible to the people of Cuba.

This goal can be pursued in two ways. It can be pursued by the road of invasion and war. Or it can be pursued by the road of unremitting pressure and isolation.

War is obviously a method of last resort. This government has repeatedly stated that it will not conduct an invasion of Cuba unless the Castro regime undertakes to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force. No responsible voice in our country advocates invasion on any other terms. For us to behave otherwise would be to be false to our traditions as a nation. Should, however, the Castro regime threaten other states, we will use whatever means are necessary to prevent this regime from taking action against any part of the western hemisphere.

In the meantime, the road of pressure and isolation has already produced significant results. In the political field, the nations of the hemisphere have excluded the Castro regime from the Organization of American States and have pronounced the principles of



that regime incompatible with those of the Inter-American system. Last October, the Latin American countries voted unanimously in support of the quarantine. Only two (chk) Latin American states today have ambassadors in Havana. Throughout the hemisphere, there has been a steady decline in the Fidelista and Communist influence.

In the economic field, trade between Cuba and the Atlantic Community and Latin America in 1962 was one-third of what it was in 1961, and will be still smaller in 1963. The number of free world ships calling at Cuban ports is 10 per cent (chk) of what it was a year ago.

In the security field, the states of Central America recently took action at San Jose to control the movement of people to and from Cuba and to protect the hemisphere against Cuban subversive activities. At the same time, we have assisted a number of Latin American countries in developing programs to counter internal subversion and insurrection. Our aerial surveillance of Cuba, continued under the sponsorship of the OAS (chk), assures us full advance warning in the event of any new military effort within Cuba.

These measures to seal off Cuba from the Inter-American community must be seen against the background of the continent-wide

undertaking, through the Alliance for Progress, to combat poverty, ignorance and disease throughout the Americas, to advance economic progress, social justice and personal freedom and to bring a better life to all the people of the hemisphere. As this great affirmative effort gathers force, the contrast between the possibilities of democratic development and the actualities of Communist mismanagement and oppression, as exhibited in Cuba, will further hasten the inevitable downfall of the Castro regime.

There is no cheap or painless way of freeing Cuba overnight. But the passion for freedom in Latin America is in the grain of history, just as dictatorship anywhere on this continent represents a frustration of the deep hopes and needs of the people of the hemisphere. The inexorable processes of economic, political and moral isolation will in the end render the position of the Castro regime untenable and make the Cuban people free -- as these same processes have ended the careers of innumerable other American dictators and brought freedom to their peoples. We shall continue to pursue the policies of pressure and isolation with full confidence in their present effectiveness and in their final success.